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tial impact of shopping centers as public forums.4 2
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center 3 continues a trend toward fur-
ther restrictions on private property ownership rights." Courts have
often balanced the competing interests of free expression and private
property.45 Changing social and economic conditions assure that if
courts continue to employ this balancing test both the right of free ex-
pression and property rights will remain in flux.4 6 Robins demonstrates
that state guarantees of free expression are expandable and that liti-
gants may possibly circumvent the state action requirement of the four-
teenth amendment by asserting claims under state constitutions.
LANDLORD & TENANT-RETALIATORY EVICTION-HAWAII REC-
OGNIZES COMMON-LAW RETALIATORY EVICTION DEFENSE SUPPLE-
MENTARY TO STATE STATUTE. Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 59
Hawaii 104, 577 P.2d 326 (1978). Windward Partners petitioned the
State Land Use .Commission to rezone its land from "agricultural" to
"urban" as a first step in a plan to develop the area into a residential
community.! Four residential and four nonresidential tenants who oc-
cupied the land attended a statutorily required public land-use hearing2
and vigorously opposed the rezoning. After the Commission denied
the petition, the landowners terminated the tenants' month-to-month
tenancies. When the tenants refused to vacate, the owners instituted
eviction proceedings. The trial court refused as a matter of law to al-
in the nation's 21 largest metropolitan areas account for 50 percent of the retail trade,
while the innercity downtowns are dying.
Id. at 618 (footnotes omitted).
42. 23 Cal. 3d at 907-08, 592 P.2d at 345-46, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59.
43. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 419 (1979) (No.
79-289).
44. For an excellent discussion of the changing nature of property rights in the United States,
see Powell, supra note 39.
45. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The balancing test employed by the
courts appears in Heneley, supra note 18.
46. Agriculture Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 404, 546 P.2d 687,
694-95, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183, 190-91 (1976) (power of government to regulate uses of property must
be adaptable to changing environment).
1. Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 59 Hawaii 104, 577 P.2d 326 (1978).
2. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-4(e) (1976).
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low the tenants' defense of retaliatory eviction and granted the land-
lord's motion for summary judgment.3  On appeal, the Hawaii
Supreme Court reversed and held- a residential or nonresidential ten-
ant's claim of eviction in retaliation for his exercise of a statutory right
that protects a property interest in his tenancy is an affirmative defense
in a summary possession proceeding.4
According to traditional property law, a landlord held an absolute
right to terminate a periodic tenancy regardless of motive.- Courts6
and legislatures7 have in recent years8 formulated exceptions to this
rule to effectuate the legislative policy underlying the enactment of
housing codes. Because the enforcement of housing codes depends
3. 59 Hawaii at 108, 577 P.2d at 329.
The trial court held that the defense was precluded by Aluli v. Trusdell, 54 Hawaii 417, 508
P.2d 1217 (1973). In A/u/i a tenant claimed that his landlord restricted his first-amendment rights
by evicting him in retaliation for having encouraged other tenants to form a tenants' union. The
court rejected the tenant's defense, finding: (1) no impairment of the tenant's constitutional rights,
as membership could continue; (2) the landlord had merely exercised his right to terminate; and
(3) no state action upon which to base a first amendment claim. Id. at 420, 508 P.2d at 1220. The
Windsard trial court, finding no material factual issues and interpreting the retaliatory eviction
defense as "insufficient as a matter of law . . . in a summary proceeding" under the Aluli hold-
ing, granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 59 Hawaii at 108, 577 P.2d at 329.
The tenants in Windward based their claim to the defense on public policy rather than on
constitutional grounds. The Hawaii Supreme Court thus concluded that Alui did not govern its
decision in the present case. 59 Hawaii at 109-10, 577 P.2d at 329.
4. 59 Hawaii at 116, 577 P.2d at 333.
5. See. e.g.. LaChance v. Hoyt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 207, 269 A.2d 303 (1969); Snitman v. Good-
man, 118 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1955); Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 85 N.E.2d 435 (1949); Glad-
well v. Holcomb, 60 Ohio St. 427, 54 N.E. 473 (1899); Motoda v. Donohoe, 1 Wash. App. 174, 459
P.2d 654 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Tarver v. G & C Constr.
Corp.. No. 64-C2945 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1964); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476
P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
7. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-74 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd
1966).
8. The first restrictions placed on the landlord's right to recover premises from a tenant
whose lease had expired were a result of the housing shortage following World War II. See Hous-
ing and Rent Act of 1947, ch. 163, § 209, 61 Stat. 193, 200. These restrictions were emergency
measures only and were repealed in 1953. Housing and Rent Act of 1953, ch. 31, § 5, 67 Stat. 23.
Only New York retained the wartime measures, and to this date New York has extensive rent
control laws, justified as emergency controls. Rent and Eviction Regulations of the Division of
Housing and Community Renewal, §§ 1-117, reprinted after N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8597 (Mc-
Kinney 1974); New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law, §§ Y51-1.0 to -18.0, reprinted after
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8617 (McKinney 1974).
Landlords may not evict tenants when eviction operates to chill the exercise of first-amendment
rights; e.g., the right to vote. United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/15
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largely on private citizens' reports,9 landlord evictions in retaliation for
a tenant's report of violations would discourage other tenants from
making similar reports and thus frustrate the purpose of the codes. 10
Some states have further extended protection against retaliatory evic-
tions to tenants exercising their statutory rights."I Presently, most juris-
dictions have either a common-law 2  or a statutory 13 prohibition
against retaliatory eviction.'4 The Hawaii statute, in part, disallows
any action against a tenant to recover possession of the dwelling unit
after the tenant has complained in good faith to the landlord or appro-
priate governmental agencies about conditions that constitute a viola-
9. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
10. Id. at 701.
11. Several jurisdictions have promulgated particularly broad prohibitions against retaliatory
eviction. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:42-10.l0 to .14 (West. Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10, -11 (1970). The
New Jersey statute is reproduced in note 34 infra.
12. The following cases may provide a basis for a prohibition against retaliatory evictions:
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (dicta); Sims v. Century
Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (cause of action for damages only); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (dicta); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173
N.W.2d 297 (1970) (tenant must prove a condition that in fact violated housing code).
13. Thirty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes prohibiting retaliatory
evictions. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974); id.
§ 33-1491 (Supp. 1978-1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (Deering 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-
33 (1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 45-1654 (West Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60 (West
Supp. 1978) (interpreted in Bowles v. Blue Lake Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1974), and 1
FLA. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 2-11.07 (1975)); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-74 (1976); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 562A.36, 562B.32 (West Supp. 1979-
1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.705 (Baldwin 1979); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (West Supp. 1978-1979); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1
(Cum. Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); id. ch. 239,
§ 2A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5720 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 70-24-431 (1978); NED. REv.
STAT. § 76-1439 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.510 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 540:13-a,-
b (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .14 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-
7-39, -40 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (1975), interpretedin State v. Cleve, 74 C.V.S. 852 (Carteret County Super. Ct. 1974), cited
in Comment, Prohibition of Retaiiatory Eviction in Landlord-Tenant Relations: A Study of Practice
and Proposals, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 861, 862 n.1 1 (1975-76)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02, .03
(Page 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10,-I1 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-5505 (1977); id. § 64-2854 (1976); VA.
CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.240, .250 (West Supp. 1978).
14. For an historical analysis of retaliatory eviction, see Comment, Retaliatory Eviction in
Texas-An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 303, 305 (1978); Comment, California's
Common Law Defense Against Landlord Retaliatory Conduct, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1163
(1975); 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 525, 525 (1978).
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tion of a health law or regulation. 15
In Windward Partners ;' Delos Santos 6 the court conceded that the
Hawaii statute did not protect the tenants from retaliatory evictions
arising from the tenants' public opposition to the landlord's rezoning
application. 7 The court, however, found that the statute did not "pur-
port to be the sole expression of the rights and remedies available to
landlords and tenants."' 8 Tenants could also rely on equitable de-
fenses in summary possession proceedings,' 9 including the doctrine of
retaliatory eviction."0
Two basic concerns prompted the court to incorporate the retaliatory
eviction doctrine into its common law and accord this defense to the
four residential tenants in this case. First, the court noted that the legis-
lature had granted the residential tenants a statutory right to appear
before the Land Use Commission at a public hearing and offer testi-
mony relevant to their landlord's rezoning petition.2' The legislative
15. The Hawaii statute provides:
Notwithstanding that the tenant has no written rental agreement or that it has expired, so
long as the tenant continues to tender the usual rent to the landlord or proceeds to tender
receipts for rent lawfully withheld, no action or proceeding to recover possession of the
dwelling unit may be maintained against the tenant, nor shall the landlord otherwise
cause the tenant to quit the dwelling unit involuntarily, nor demand an increase in rent
from the tenant, nor decrease the services to which the tenant has been entitled, after:
(1) The tenant has complained in good faith to the department of health, landlord,
building department, office of consumer protection, or any other governmental
agency concerned with landlord-tenant disputes of conditions in or affecting his
dwelling unit which constitutes a violation of a health law or regulation or of any
provision of this chapter, or
(2) The department of health or other governmental agency has filed a notice or
complaint of a violation of a health law or regulation or any provision of this
chapter, or
(3) The tenant has in good faith requested repairs under section 521-63 or 521-64.
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 521-74 (1976).
16. 59 Hawaii 104, 577 P.2d 326 (1978).
17. Id. at 110-11, 577 P.2d at 330. The landlord had argued that the four residential tenants'
opposition to rezoning did not fall within any of the enumerated activities protected under the
statute and that the retaliatory eviction defense was not available to the four nonresidential ten-
ants whose rented premises were being used for commercial purposes only. Id. at 110, 577 P.2d at
330.
18. Id. at 110-11, 577 P.2d at 330. The court cited HAWAI REv. STAT. § 521-3(a) in support
of its conclusion: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this chapter, the principles of
law and equity ...supplement its provisions." 59 Hawaii at 110-11, 577 P.2d at 330.
19. See Island Holidays v. Fitzgerald, 58 Hawaii 522, 574 P.2d 884 (1978).
20. In recognizing retaliatory eviction as an equitable defense in this case, the court surveyed
other jurisdictions' incorporation of the doctrine into their common law. See 59 Hawaii at 111-14,
577 P.2d at 330-32.
21. Id. at 114, 577 P.2d at 332.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/15
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purpose underlying this right was to encourage all interested parties to
express their views on the rezoning proposal.2 2 That purpose would be
frustrated if landlords, by threatening eviction, could discourage ten-
ants from speaking in a public forum.23 Second, the court, in a cryptic
passage, stated that it premised its holding "substantially on the recog-
nition of the salutory policy of protecting the property interests of the
tenants from retaliating landlords."'24
The court thus fashioned a two-prong test to determine whether a
residential tenant can invoke an affirmative defense of retaliatory evic-
tion. A tenant must show that the eviction resulted from (1) his exer-
cise of a statutory right (2) to protect a property interest in his
tenancy.25 The court then summarily found the test to be equally ap-
plicable to nonresidential tenants,26 although it recognized that other
jurisdictions disallow the defense when asserted by commercial ten-
ants.27
The Windward Partners decision is important for three reasons. The
Hawaii Supreme Court is the first court to shape a common-law retalia-
tory eviction defense as a supplement to an existing statutory defense.28
22. Id. at 115, 577 P.2d at 332.
23. Id. at 116, 577 P.2d at 333.
24. Id. (emphasis added) In a footnote to this statement, the court added:
The legislative history of HRS § 521-74 indicates that when the predecessor provision
was first enacted as Act 41 and designated as HRS § 666-34, the primary purpose was to
encourage the repair of substandard housing conditions and to provide tenants with pro-
tection from evictions and rent increases by landlords for actions taken by tenants to
remedy unsafe or unsanitary conditions. Standing Committee Report Number 485-70,
House Bill 43. In 1972, when the legislature enacted the Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code, it removed the retaliatory provision from chapter 666 and enacted it as HRS
§ 521-74, amending the provision to include as protected conduct, complaints by tenants
for other landlord-tenant disputes, in addition to health-related disputes.
Id. at 116-17 n.ll, 577 P.2d at 333-34 n.ll.
25. Id. at 116, 577 P.2d at 333.
26. Id. at 117, 577 P.2d at 334.
27. Id. at 118, 577 P.2d at 334. The court cited the following cases, in which commercial
tenants could not raise a retaliatory eviction defense to unlawful detainer proceedings: Clark Oil
& Ref. Corp. v. Thomas, 25 Ill. App. 3d 428, 323 N.E.2d 479 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Rubenfeld, 48 A.D.2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975); Cornitius, Inc. v. Wheeler, 276 Or. 747, 556
P.2d 666 (1976); Rossow Oil Co. v. Heiman, 72 Wis. 2d 696, 242 N.W.2d 176 (1976). For other
cases holding that commercial tenants may not raise a retaliatory eviction defense, see Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Handley, 76 Cal. App. 3d 956, 143 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1978); Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4
Cal. App. 3d 716, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1970). See also S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d
719, 730, 552 P.2d 721, 727, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY § 14.8 (1977). No other case has allowed a commercial tenant to assert a retaliatory eviction
defense.
28. See notes 32-36 infra and accompanying text.
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Hawaii is also the first jurisdiction to extend this defense to nonresiden-
tial tenants.29 Finally, the decision appears to grant tenants a property
interest in their tenancies not previously recognized at common law.
30
By supplementing the Hawaii retaliatory eviction statute with a com-
mon-law defense,3' the Hawaii Supreme Court effectively ignored the
legislative determination of the scope of tenants' protected rights.
Some commentators have argued that policy matters are best left to the
legislature because it is the branch of government most responsive to
popular needs.32 Such deference is especially important when the legis-
lature has by statute expressed its view on public policy. 33 The Hawaii
legislature could have modeled its statute after those of states that had
extended broader protection to tenants. 4 In enacting a more limited
defense, however, the legislature expressed its view on the proper bal-
ance among such competing interests as the tenant's ability to exercise
his statutory rights, the summary nature of forcible entry and detainer
suits, and the landowner's traditional right to dispose of his property as
he pleases.35 In addition to overriding the legislature's determination
of public policy, the Hawaii Supreme Court also gave short shrift to the
superior ability of the legislature to make uniform laws that provide a
definite standard upon which citizens may model their conduct.
36
29. See notes 37-40 infra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 41-42 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 6-15 supra and accompanying text.
32. Comment, Prohibition of Retaliatory Eviction in Landlord-Tenant Relations.- A Study of
Practice and Proposals, 54 N.C.L. REV. 861,881 (1976); Comment, Retaliatory Eviction in Texas-
An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 303, 308 (1978). See also Schweiger v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 518, 476 P.2d 97, 104, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 736 (1970); Dickhut v. Norton, 45
Wis. 2d 389, 395, 173 N.W.2d 297, 303 (1970).
33. See Note, Retaliatory Evictton in Calfornia.- The Legislature Slams the Door and Boards
Up the Windows, 46 So. CAL. L. REV. 118, 127 (1972).
34. The New Jersey statute, for example, went into effect in 1970, well before the enactment
of the Hawaii statute. It provides in part that no landlord can evict a tenant:
(a) As a reprisal for the tenant's efforts to secure or enforce any rights under the lease
or contract, or under the laws of the state of New Jersey or its governmental subdi-
visions, or of the United States; or
(b) As a reprisal for the tenant's good faith complaint to a governmental authority of
the landlord's alleged violation of any health or safety law, regulation, code or ordi-
nance, or state law or regulation which has as its objective the regulation of prem-
ises used for dwelling purposes.
N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .14 (Supp. 1979-1980).
35. The Hawaii Supreme Court noted exactly this reasoning in its earlier opinion of Aluli v.
Trusdell, 54 Hawaii 417, 421, 508 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1973); see S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17
Cal. 3d 719, 721, 552 P.2d 721, 723, 31 Cal. Rptr. 761, 763 (1976); Note, supra note 33, at 127.
36. See Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 478, 490, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 74 (Monroe County Ct.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/15
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Not only did the Hawaii court improperly extend the scope of pro-
tected tenant activities, it also contradicted prior law by extending the
retaliatory eviction defense to a new class of persons-nonresidential
tenants. The court spent little time justifying this innovation. 38  A
number of distinctions between residential and nonresidential tenants
might justify different legal treatment of the tWo. 39 By failing to review
these distinctions, the court effected a potentially major change in prop-
erty law without well-reasoned justification.40
Because the court in extending a common-law retaliatory eviction
defense to both residential and nonresidential tenants disregarded the
legislature's policy determinations in this area and failed to recognize
important distinctions between residential and nonresidential tenants,
the actual explanation for this decision may lie in the court's concern
over protecting tenants from unjust evictions. The court's statement
that it premised its holding substantially on "the salutory policy of pro-
tecting the property interests of the tenants from retaliating landlords"
supports this view.4'
The court's reference to a tenant's "property interest," however, is
perplexing. According to traditional property law, a landlord may ter-
minate a periodic tenancy at the expiration of the term regardless of
1972); Comment, Retaliatory Eviction in Texas-An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J.
303, 309 (1978).
37. 59 Hawaii at 117, 577 P.2d at 334.
38. Id. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. The court in Cornitius, Inc. v. Wheeler,
276 Or. 747, 556 P.2d 666 (1976), for example, expressed doubt whether the doctrine would ever
apply to tenants other than apartment dwellers.
39. Although an evicted commercial tenant may have no place to work, an evicted residential
tenant may have no place to live. In a tight urban housing market, a residential tenant may
encounter greater difficulty in finding another apartment than would a commercial tenant at-
tempting to find another office. A commercial tenant, then, may be only minimally deterred from
exercising a statutory right as compared to a residential tenant. Additionally, the nonresidential
tenant may be better able to protect his rights because of greater bargaining power vis-fi-vis the
landlord than the residential tenant. These differences might only justify extension of the retalia-
tory eviction defense to the residential context.
For a general discussion on how courts have treated differently commercial and residential
tenants with regard to the implied warranty of habitability, see 35 U. PiTT. L. REv. 901 (1974).
40. A number of commentators, however, have advocated the result reached by the Hawaii
Supreme Court. See Moskovitz, Retaliatory Eviction-A New Doctrine in California, 46 CAL. ST.
B.J. 23 (1971); Comment, Calffornia's Common Law Defense Against Landlord Retaliatory Con-
duct, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1161 (1975); 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 522 (1976); 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1365
(1971).
41. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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motive;42 thus, a tenant has no property interest in the renewal of his
tenancy. The court, therefore, in precluding Windward Partners from
terminating for retaliatory reasons the month-to-month tenancies of the
eight tenants in this case, seems to have recognized an expectancy-i e.,
"a property interest"-in the renewal of periodic tenancies.
For this reason the court's decision may signal a significant change in
the judicial attitude toward the doctrine of retaliatory eviction.43
Courts originally fashioned the retaliatory eviction doctrine in response
to the public policy need for private citizens' reports of housing code
violations.44 The Windward Partners court may have shifted the doc-
trine's foundation to the need to protect tenants from retaliating land-
lords.
45
DOMESTIC LAW-DIVORCE-KENTUCKY INCLUDES LICENSE TO
PRACTICE DENTISTRY IN MARITAL PROPERTY DIVISION. Inman v. In-
man, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Early in the Inmans' seven-
teen-year marriage, Mrs. Inman worked as a teacher to enable her
husband to attend dental school. Although Dr. Inman worked steadily
as a dentist after obtaining his license and the Inmans acquired several
42. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
43. California may have followed Hawaii's lead in extending a common-law retaliatory evic-
tion defense to tenants beyond its statutory defense. In Vargas v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 3d 902,
587 P.2d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1978), the court allowed an agricultural tenant to assert a com-
mon-law retaliatory eviction defense in addition to its statutory defense. The landlord conceded
that the common-law defense existed, but claimed that the lower court lacked jurisdiction. This
concession is surprising in light of four law review articles that had debated the question of
whether a common-law retaliatory eviction defense still existed in California after enactment of
the California statute. See Moskovitz, supra note 40; Note, supra note 33; Comment, Calfornia's
Common La, Defense Against Landlord Retaliatory Conduct, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1161 (1975); 22
HASTINGS L.J. 1365 (1971). The California Supreme Court noted this debate and expressly left
open the question in S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 729 n.4, 552 P.2d 721, 727
n.4, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767 n.4 (1976). But see Laster v. Bowman, 52 Ohio App. 2d 379, 370
N.E.2d 767 (1977) (statute is exclusive remedy available to evicted tenants).
44. See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.
45. If the interest granted to the tenants in Windward extends one step further, a situation
may develop in which a landlord cannot evict a tenant without good cause. See D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. § 45-1653 (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1979-
1980); note 8 supra. Tenants in these states seem to have an even greater "property interest" in
their tenancies than the Windward tenants.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/15
